Death, Taxes, and Now Divorce--The Dyad Expands to a Triad: ERISA\u27s Social Policy Harms Women\u27s Rights by Jaffke, Cheyanna L.
Death, Taxes, and Now Divorce-
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By CHEYA1 NA L. JAFFKE*
MR. AND MRS. Smith reside in Nevada, a community property state.
The Smith family has added two children in the last four years. Mr.
Smith works for an insurance company, while Mrs. Smith raises their
two children and occasionally works as a substitute teacher. The Smith
family is not wealthy, although Mr. Smith's pension plan at work has a
balance of $100,000. They believe that they share everything equally
because they live in a community property state. However, under the
current interpretation of federal retirement benefits laws, Mrs. Smith
does not share in her husband's retirement benefits unless she di-
vorces her husband or outlives him.
When Mr. Smith retires in thirty years, he will receive a lump sum
payment of 50% of his account balance and an annuity payment for
the remainder of his life. Because he is married, the annuity will be
paid to him and his wife for their joint lives.
If Mr. Smith dies prior to reaching the retirement age of sixty-
five, Mrs. Smith will receive an annuity equal to what she would have
received under the joint annuity with her husband. The remaining
vested benefits would be distributed to Mr. Smith's estate for disposi-
tion according to his will.
If Mrs. Smith dies prior to her husband retiring, her estate re-
ceives none of the retirement benefits. Mr. Smith's benefits would be
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paid to him upon his retirement in the form of the 50% lump sum
payment and an annuity amount for his life.
If Mr. Smith dies after he retires but before Mrs. Smith dies, then
the annuity amount that they were receiving would be reduced by
50%, and Mrs. Smith will receive half of the joint annuity amount for
the rest of her life. The lump sum amount, which was distributed to
Mr. Smith upon his retirement, would be an asset of Mr. Smith' s es-
tate. He would be free to bequeath the lump sum to anyone he
chooses.1
If Mrs. Smith dies after her husband retires but prior to his death,
the annuity amount the Smiths were receiving would be reduced by
half. She will not be able to bequeath any of the retirement benefits,
unless her husband permits her to do so. Mr. Smith would permit this
by either making the lump sum payment a community property asset
or taking title to the asset in both of their names.
How did this disparity in marital property rights arise? It was cre-
ated by the United States Supreme Court's current interpretation of
federal retirement laws.2 In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act 3 ("ERISA") in response to a series of
retirement plan failures and other pension plan problems.4 In later
years, Congress amended ERISA with the Retirement Equity Act5
("REA") to provide women better security in their husbands' retire-
ment benefits. In order to accomplish its goals, Congress needed to
1. Depending upon state marital property laws, if Mr. Smith commingled this asset
with other community property assets, then it would be considered a community property
asset. Generally, as a community property asset, one-half would belong to Mrs. Smith. In a
non-community property state, the asset would most likely belong to Mr. Smith, because it
would be titled in his name only.
2. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) [hereinafter Boggs III].
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 83
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)). Common use of
the term ERISA refers to the statute itself as well as the large body of administrative rulings
and case law interpreting it. When referring to the statute alone, this Article will provide
the cite of the statute.
4. The most notable incident is what is referred to as the Studebaker incident. See
discussion infra Part I.A.2. For a discussion of the abuses which led to ERISA's enactment,
see David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism,
48 U. Purr. L. REV. 427, 443-45 (1987). For a summary of the political, social, and legisla-
tive impetuses behind ERISA, see SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, U.S. SENATE, 98TH CONG., THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 1-25 (Comm.
Print 1984).
5. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
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prevent interference by state laws; therefore, it drafted a preemption
clause into ERISA. 6
In Boggs v. Boggs,7 the United States Supreme Court held that ER-
ISA preempted state community property laws because these marital
property laws frustrate the purpose of ERISA.8 ERISA's purpose is to
protect plan participants and beneficiaries,9 but the Boggs Court ex-
tended the purpose of ERISA beyond its intended boundaries. In ex-
panding the purpose of ERISA, the Court judicially grafted a social
policy onto ERISA, favoring the living over the dead. The Court used
this social policy to justify stripping a woman10 of her property rights
in her husband's retirement benefits when she predeceases him.
Even if the Court is correct that Congress intended to favor the
living over the dead, it is a poor policy choice because it does more
societal harm than good. First, the result of this interpretation of an
otherwise facially neutral law disparately impacts women. Second, this
policy devalues the contribution that women make to their families by
raising children and maintaining the home. Third, favoring the living
over the dead ignores the current theory of marriage-that marriage
is a partnership. Additionally, it assumes that women only need
enough property for their support and maintenance. This policy sug-
gests that society supports stripping an owner of her right to transfer
her property at her death. This policy reverts the determination of
who owns the retirement benefits to the title system of ownership-a
system that community property states have expressly elected not to
use because it disadvantages women and forces them to rely upon the
good intentions of their husbands. Finally, by choosing to favor the
living over the dead, this policy signals to women that divorce is the
best way to protect their property rights-in effect, advocating divorce
and discouraging life-long marriage.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of ERISA and describes
the relevant provisions of ERISA. In addition, Part I describes the vari-
ous state marital property laws. Part I also analyzes the Supreme
Court's determination in Boggs of the purpose of ERISA.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). For the language and a discussion of the history
surrounding the drafting of the preemption clause, see infta Part I.A.4.
7. Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
8. See id. at 844.
9. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 513 (1996)' (stating that ERISA has a gen-
eral purpose of protecting participants' and beneficiaries' interests).
10. A man can be a predeceased nonparticipating spouse. However, in the typical
case, the non-titled spouse is the woman. The arguments and observations throughout this
Article apply with equal force, regardless of gender.
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Part II of this Article examines ERISA's purpose at enactment
and the effect the REA amendments have on that purpose. This sec-
tion demonstrates that ERISA's purpose is to protect plan participants
and beneficiaries from employers and plan administrators, and that
the Court in Boggs erroneously extended the scope of protection be-
yond the intent and text of ERISA.
Part III examines the Court's finding that state marital property
laws are preempted by ERISA. It demonstrates that women were given
ownership rights in their husbands' retirement benefits.
Part IV discusses the deficient policy choice of favoring the living
over the dead. It argues that the result has a disparate impact upon
women; this policy devalues a woman's contribution to her family, ig-
nores the theory of marriage as an economic partnership, and encour-
ages divorce.
Finally, Part V examines solutions that have been presented to
remedy the inequity. Part V then proffers a simple amendment to ER-
ISA that would allow probate orders to qualify as qualified domestic
relations orders." This solution is designed to remedy the inequities
created by the Court's interpretation of ERISA's social policy.
I. Background
A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
1. What Are Pension Plans?
ERISA regulates "employee pension benefit plans"' 2 and "em-
11. A qualified domestic relations order is defined as "any judgment, decree or order
... which relates to the provisions of... marital property rights ... to a spouse [or] former
spouse . . . and [which] is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a
community property law)." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (3) (B) (i) (1994). A qualified domestic rela-
tions order allows a non-participant spouse to share in the retirement benefits of her
spouse, even in the event of divorce. See id. § 1056(d) (3). For further explanation of quali-
fied domestic relations orders, see infta Part I.B.3.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (A) (1994). Section 1002(2) (A) defines employee pension
benefit plans as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was .. . established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or
program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
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ployee welfare benefit plans.' 3 The general purpose of pension plans
is to provide retirement income to employees. 14 The two types of pen-
sion plans are the defined benefit plan and the defined contribution
plan.
A defined benefit plan guarantees a retiree a predetermined pay-
ment amount. 15 With a defined benefit plan the risk of investment is
on the employer. The employer makes all contributions to the plan
on behalf of the employee, so there are no individual accounts.' 6 De-
fined benefit plans are not as common as defined contribution plans.
A defined contribution plan acts as a savings plan for employees.
The employee, and sometimes the employer, make contributions to
an individual account in the employee's name.1 7 Two common types
of defined contribution plans are a 401 (k) plan' 8 and a profit sharing
plan. 19 With a defined contribution plan, a participant is not guaran-
teed to receive a predetermined amount upon retirement because the
risk of the investments made with the contributions is on the
employee. 20
Most participating employees defer receipt of current income un-
til retirement by placing the money into an account sponsored by
their employer. 2' Their employer provides them with a limited range
of investment options, typically mutual funds, individual stocks, and
13. See id. § 1002(1). Section 1002(1) defines a welfare plan as "any plan, fund, or
program which was ... established or maintained by an employer.., for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits." Id. Although ERISA regu-
lates both types of plans, this Article focuses on pension plans.
14. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i) (as amended in 1976).
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1976). For example, the em-
ployer promises to pay the employee $500 a month for life when the employee retires after
the age of sixty-five.
16. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i).
17. See id. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii). For example, the employer promises the employee that
it will match the employee's current contribution up to a certain set percentage of income;
or the employer promises to contribute $50 a month to the employee's retirement account
while the employee is working full-time for the employer.
18. Most often this type of retirement plan is a 401(k) plan, named after the Internal
Revenue Code section which grants the plan tax benefits. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (1994). In
a 401(k) plan, the employee makes contributions from current income into an account,
which the employer may or may not match. See id. § 401(k) (2) (A). The employee, gener-
ally, has control over the investment decisions made regarding his or her account. See id.
§ 401(k) (2) (B).
19. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii). Profit sharing plans permit employees to share
in the employer's profits.
20. See id.
21. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 24-25, 42 (2d ed. 1995).
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bonds.22 The employee chooses from the options available.2 3 The ac-
count will earn income through the purchase and sale of the mutual
funds, stocks, or bonds, as well as the interest and dividends generated
by these investments. 24 The contributions and the income generated
by them are accumulated until the employee retires.25 Upon retire-
ment, accumulated income is paid to the employee in the manner
chosen by the employee, such as a lump sum payment or an annuity.
2. ERISA's History
Congress elected to occupy the field of regulation of retirement
benefits in part because of the Studebaker incident.26 In December of
1963, the Studebaker plant closed its doors and terminated the plant's
pension plan. 27  Because Studebaker's pension plan was un-
derfunded,28 over 4,000 workers who were within twenty years of re-
tirement or less received only fifteen cents for every dollar of vested
pension benefits. 2 9 Over 2,900 workers received absolutely nothing.30
In response to this incident as well as others, Congress investi-
gated the need for additional federal regulation.31 The House and
Senate focused on the abuses that occurred in the administration of
these funds. 32 The Senate Special Committee on Aging observed that
the "extremely rapid growth of private pension plans had led to all
22. See id. at 50.
23. See id.
24. See generally Vincent Amorosso & Paul C. Wirth, Pension Plans and Other Post-Retire-
ment and Post-Employment Benefits, in ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK (D.R. Carmichael et al. eds.,
9th ed. 1999).
25. See26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2) (B) (1994).
26. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 62.
27. See Caroline Wrenn Cleveland, ERISA Preemption: As the Federal Courts Identify the
Outer Boundaries of ERISA 's Preemption Clause, What Are the Implications for South Carolina State
Actions?, 42 S.C. L. REV. 743, 744 (1991).
28. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 63.
29. See id. at 65.
30. See Cleveland, supra note 27, at 744.
31. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 ("WPPDA") was the first
federal legislation to regulate employee pension and welfare plans. See Welfare and Pen-
sion Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (repealed 1975). How-
ever, Congress limited the scope of WPPDA to disclosure. See id. § 2(b). WPPDA failed to
prescribe funding rules or participation requirements for employee benefit plans. It also
failed to outline the fiduciary responsibilities of fund administrators or to attempt to regu-
late pension plans in any extensive manner.
32. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in SPECIAL COMM. ON
AGING, U.S. SENATE, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FiRsT
DECADE 6-25, reprinted in LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 67-68.
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manner of abuses, ranging from ineptness and lack of know-how to
outright looting of benefit funds and corrupt administration." 33
ERISA was designed to prevent these abuses and protect employ-
ees. ERISA requires that a plan administrator, often the employer, file
certain forms and observe reporting and disclosure obligations.34 ER-
ISA also dictates certain participation, funding, accrual, and vesting
rules.35 Part one of ERISA provides the reporting and disclosure rules
that plan administrators must follow. 36 The participation and vesting
requirements are laid out in part two.3 7 Part three is aimed at prevent-
ing plans from being underfunded.3 8 Congress outlined fiduciary re-
sponsibilities of plan administrators in part four.3 9 Finally, part five,
which is the last of those parts aimed at pension plans, provides the
rules for enforcement and administration of ERISA.40 All of these
parts contain rules and regulations aimed at governing plan adminis-
trators. 41 Three areas of ERISA are important to this Article: anti-
alienation, preemption, and the Retirement Equity Act amendments.
3. ERISA's Anti-Alienation Provision
When Congress enacted ERISA, it included a requirement that
pension plans must prohibit the assignment or alienation of bene-
fits. 42 ERISA does not define the terms "assigned" or "alienated." But
the terms have been defined by Treasury Department regulations to
33. Id. at 67-68.
34. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1169 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
35. See id.
36. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). For example, section 1021
imposes a duty to disclose and report to plan participants and beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1021 (1994).
37. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). For example, section 1052
limits the amount of time an employee must wait before he or she is permitted to partici-
pate in his or her employer's pension plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994).
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). For example, section 1082
sets minimum funding standards that plans must meet in order to qualify for tax benefits.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). For example, section 1104
requires that a plan administrators acts as a prudent man would act. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
40. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1147 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Section 1144 is the preemp-
tion clause, which preempts all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. See 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
41. Some commentators might argue that 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994), which re-
quires that a plan prohibit assignments and alienations, is addressed to the participants
and the beneficiaries. However, the language of this section speaks directly to plan admin-
istrators by telling them that their plans must forbid assignments and alienations. See id.
42. See id. (stating that each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated).
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mean "[a] ny direct or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires
from a participant or beneficiary" an interest enforceable against a
plan to "all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may
become, payable to the participant or beneficiary." 43
ERISA did permit two exceptions to this anti-alienation require-
ment.44 First, a plan can permit a participant or beneficiary to borrow
from the plan using the participant's accrued, nonforfeitable benefit
as security.45 Second, the participant may make a revocable and volun-
tary assignment of up to 10% of any benefit payment.46
4. ERISA's Preemption Provision
Congress knew when it enacted ERISA that it was necessary to
preempt state laws. It used broad language of preemption when it
wrote section 1144: "the provisions of [ERISA] shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan. '4 7 Originally, both the House 48 and Senate49
versions of ERISA limited preemption to those state laws which regu-
lated employee benefit plans. However, the Conference Committee
broadened the language of ERISA's preemption provision without any
effective explanation in its report.50 Because the signing ceremony for
ERISA was set for Labor Day, this change, which occurred ten days
before the ceremony, was accepted "without thorough investigation,
spirited debate, and careful study."51 As a result, the legislative history
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c) (ii) (as amended in 1976).
44. See infra text accompanying note 153. The Retirement Equity Act created a third
exception, qualified domestic relations orders. See id.
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2) (1994) (stating in part that "a loan made to a partici-
pant or beneficiary shall not be treated as an assignment or alienation if such loan is se-
cured by the participant's accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt from the tax
imposed by section 4975 of title 26 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason of
section 4975(d) (1) of title 26").
46. See id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
48. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 514 (1973), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 8860 (1974). The
House preemption provision provided that "[t]he Act supersedes all state and local laws
relating to fiduciary standards, reporting, disclosure, vesting, and funding (except for civil
action by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due or to clarify rights to future
benefits)." Id.
49. See S. 4, 93d Cong. § 699 (1973), reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 8860 (1974). The
Senate's version was "[ t] he provisions of this Act... supersede all state law as they relate to
the subject matters covered by these two acts (i.e., vesting, funding, termination insurance,
portability, reporting and fiduciary standards)." Id.
50. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court
Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REv. 951, 979 (2000).
51. Id. at 977-78.
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is of little help to understand Congress' intent in adopting ERISA's
broad preemption provision.
When a court determines the issue of preemption, it must decide
if Congress intended field preemption or conflict preemption. 52 Field
preemption 53 is when federal law completely occupies the range of
regulation, and all state laws are preempted, even those laws that are
consistent with federal law.54 Conflict preemption 55 would allow a
state to regulate in the same subject area as federal law so long as the
state law does not contradict federal law56 or frustrate the purposes
and goals of the federal law.57
In determining if Congress fully occupies the field of regulation
in a subject area, a courts looks to Congress' intent.58 Where legisla-
tion includes a preemption provision, a court will sometimes consider
Congress' intent in enacting the entire legislation containing the pre-
emption provision, while at other times it will only consider the intent
behind the preemption provision itself.59 When a court is considering
field preemption of a subject of traditional state regulation, it looks
for a clear manifestation of congressional intent to do so. 60
The Supreme Court in Boggs never determined Congress in-
tended ERISA to fully occupy the field of pension plans.61 In develop-
ing a workable test for ERISA preemption issues, the Court
determined that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan. '6 2 However, the Court realized that some state laws may
be connected in too "tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to war-
52. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
53. For a more detailed explanation of field preemption, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Rice explains that one example of field preemption is the
laws governing immigration and citizenship. See id.
54. See Bogan, supra note 50, at 961.
55. For a more detailed explanation of conflict preemption, see Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
56. See id.
57. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
58. SeeFidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); see also
Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
59. In interpreting the intent of Congress when it enacted ERISA, the Court has con-
sidered Congress' intent both in enacting the entire legislation and in crafting the preemp-
tion provision itself. Compare Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(looking at the intent of ERISA as a whole) with Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85
(1983) (looking at the intent of the preemption provision).
60. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
61. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).
62. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979)).
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rant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan. '63 Although this is the
general standard to determine preemption in ERISA cases, 6 4 this stan-
dard was not followed in Boggs.65
B. REA Amendments to ERISA
The Retirement Equity Act 66 ("REA") amended ERISA and the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to improve the delivery of retirement
benefits and provide for greater equity under private pension plans
for workers, their spouses, and their dependents. 6 7 REA was to pro-
vide equity by taking into account changes in work patterns.6 8 REA
also recognized marriage as an economic partnership 69 and the sub-
stantial contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in-
side and outside the home. 70 REA included several changes to ERISA,
which Congress felt were necessary to guarantee that the nation's pri-
vate retirement-income system provides fair treatment for women. 71
Congress' intent was to protect the nonemployee spouse from losing
his or her claim to a retirement resource through changes in marital
status due to divorce or the death of the employee spouse.72 Congress
recognized that nonemployee spouses, generally women, have an in-
terest in the pension earned by the working spouse. 73 Therefore, Con-
gress added new requirements to ERISA designed to protect the rights
of the nonemployee spouse.
1. Annuity Requirements
First, if a plan provided an annuity as a benefit, the plan was re-
quired to provide the annuity in the form of a Qualified Joint and
Survivor Annuity ("QJSA") to all married participants. 7 4 A QJSA would
pay an annuity amount to the participant and his spouse based upon
63. Id. at 100 n.21.
64. See id. at 95-96.
65. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833, 841-44 (1997) (holding that state law was preempted
under traditional conflict preemption rules making it unnecessary to address the "relate
to" test).
66. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. For a discussion about marriage as a partnership, see infra Part V.C.
70. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
71. See S. REP. No. 98-575, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2547.
72. See S. REP. No. 98-575, at 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2565.
73. See S. REP. No. 98-575, at 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2558.
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994). Section 1055(a) states:
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their joint lives, referred to as the joint annuity.75 Upon the death of
the participant, the spouse would be entitled to continue to receive an
annuity equal to at least 50% of the joint annuity amount for the rest
of her life, referred to as the "survivor annuity. '76
Second, if the plan offered any annuity options, it was required to
provide a Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuity ("QPSA") to mar-
ried participants. 77 If the participant died prior to retirement, the
QPSA would provide the surviving spouse with an annuity for her life
Each pension plan to which this section applies shall provide that-l) in the
case of a vested participant who does not die before the annuity starting date, the
accrued benefit payable to such participant shall be provided in the form of a
qualified joint and survivor annuity, and (2) in the case of a vested participant
who dies before the annuity starting date and who has a surviving spouse, a quali-
fied preretirement survivor annuity shall be provided to the surviving spouse of
such participant.
Id.
75. See id. § 1055(d)(1).
76. See id. § 1055(d). Section 1055(d) states that a QJSA is an annuity which:
(1) for the life of the participant with a survivor annuity for the life of the spouse
which is not less than 50 percent of (and is not greater than 100 percent of) the
amount of the annuity which is payable during the joint lives of the participant
and the spouse, and (2) which is the actuarial equivalent of a single annuity for
the life of the participant.
Id.
77. See id. § 1055(e)(1). Section 1055(e)(1) states that the term "qualified preretire-
ment survivor annuity" means a survivor annuity for the life of the surviving spouse of the
participant if:
(A) the payments to the surviving spouse under such annuity are not less than
the amounts which would be payable as a survivor annuity under the quali-
fied joint and survivor annuity under the plan (or the actuarial equivalent
thereof) if-
(i) in the case of a participant who dies after the date on which the partici-
pant attained the earliest retirement age, such participant had retired
with an immediate qualifiedjoint and survivor annuity on the day before
the participant's date of death, or
(ii) in the case of a participant who dies on or before the date on which the
participant would have attained the earliest retirement age, such partici-
pant had-
(I) separated from service on the date of death,
(II) survived to the earliest retirement age,
(III) retired with an immediate qualified joint and survivor annuity at
the earliest retirement age, and
(IV) died on the day after the day on which such participant would
have attained the earliest retirement age, and
(B) under the plan, the earliest period for which the surviving spouse may re-
ceive a payment under such annuity is not later than the month in which the
participant would have attained the earliest retirement age under the plan.
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based upon the amount of vested benefits at the time of the partici-
pant's death. 78
The legislative history of QJSA and QPSA demonstrates that the
Senate Finance Committee thought that pre-REA law resulted in ineq-
uitable treatment of participants in pension plans who die before
reaching the normal retirement age under their employer's plan. 79
The Finance Committee recognized that under the pre-REA law, the
participant's spouse may be entitled to no survivor benefits from the
plan even though the participant had accrued significant vested bene-
fits before death.80 Under pre-REA law, essentially, all vested benefits
were forfeited. For these reasons, the legislative history illustrates that
Congress opted to provide automatic survivor benefits to the spouses
of vested participants to protect nonemployee surviving spouses.81
2. Ownership Rights
Congress gave spouses ownership rights, including decision-mak-
ing rights in their spouses' retirement benefits, because it felt a spouse
should be involved in making choices with respect to retirement in-
come on which the spouse may also rely.8 2 Section 1055 of ERISA per-
mits the participant to opt out of the QJSA or QPSA form of benefits,
but only with the written consent of the participant's spouse.83 These
amendments suggest a recognition of a species of co-ownership, which
is consistent with marital property rights and inconsistent with the pol-
icy described in BoggS. 84
3. Qualified Domestic Relations Orders
REA also created Qualified Domestic Relations Orders
("QDROs"), allowing a non-participant spouse to share in the retire-
ment benefits of her spouse even if the couple divorces.8 5 A qualified
domestic relations order is defined as "any judgment, decree or order
... which relates to the provisions of... marital property rights... to
a spouse [or] former spouse . . .and [which] is made pursuant to a
78. See id.




83. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
84. See Boggs II, 520 U.S. 833, 852 (1997) (stating that the policy is to protect the
living by providing a stream of income).
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (3) (1994).
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State domestic relations law (including a community property law)."86
Congress created QDROs as the mechanisms to assure that former
spouses of pension plan participants received their share of the plan
benefits in the event of a divorce. 87
The provisions for QDROs arose because Congress recognized
that the courts differed in their opinions of whether state marital
property laws, as they relate to familial obligations, were preempted by
ERISA.8 8 REA's provisions for QDROs made it clear that state divorce
laws could allocate retirement benefits and still be consistent with ER-
ISA, 89 which is additional evidence of a recognition of co-ownership.
A QDRO "recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right
to ... receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a
participant under a plan."90 The statute then describes the require-
ments for an order to be a qualified domestic relations order.91 This
section does not grant a spouse a right in her husband's benefits upon
divorce; state law is still necessary to provide the right. This section is
merely a federal enforcement mechanism of a property right granted
by state marital property laws.
86. Id. § 1056(d) (3) (B) (i). This section provides:
(i) the term "qualified domestic relations order" means a domestic relations
order-
(1) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right
to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion
of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan, and
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (C) and (D)
are met, and
(ii) the term "domestic relations order" means any judgment, decree, or order
(including approval of a property settlement agreement) which-
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital
property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of
a participant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a commu-
nity property law).
Id.
87. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1991).
88. See S. REP. No. 98-575, at 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2565.
89. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (3) (B) (i) (I) (1994).
91. See id. § 1056(d) (3) (C)-(D).
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C. State Marital Property Laws
1. Community Property System
Washington, 92 Idaho, 93 California,94 Texas,95 Arizona,96 Ne-
vada,97 Louisiana,98 New Mexico, 99 and Wisconsin'00 have either a
community property or community property-like regime for married
couples. In these states, marriage is considered an equal partnership
with each spouse contributing equally to the marriage.10 All assets
acquired during the marriage are presumed to be community prop-
erty, which grants each spouse a one-half undivided ownership inter-
est in the asset.'0 2 Any expenditure of time, skill, or effort by a
married person during the marriage, which results in the acquisition
of property, produces community property.10 3 Wages, salaries, and an-
ything of value acquired in the course of an employment relationship
during the marriage are community property.'0 4
2. Common Law Property System
Spousal property rights in the other forty-one states are deter-
mined under one of two systems: the title system and the equitable
distribution system. The title system, which is not used when the mar-
riage ends in divorce, treats the owner of the property as the person
who held title to the property. 10 5 The equitable distribution system
92. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 1997).
93. See IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Michie 1999).
94. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 1994).
95. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (1998).
96. See ARuz. REV. STAT. § 25-211 (2000).
97. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (Michie 1998).
98. See LA. CODE CIv. PRoc. ANN. art. 2338 (West 1985).
99. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12 (Michie 1978).
100. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (West Supp. 1999). Wisconsin has incorporated some
community property principles, but it is not a formal community property state. See How-
ard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community Property:
Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 769, 769 n.2.
101. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833, 840 (1997).
102. Not all community property states grant an immediate one-half interest upon di-
vorce. Arizona, Nevada, Texas, and Washington divide property at divorce by equitable
distribution. See Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-
Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-
Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 504 (2000).
103. See GRACE GANZ BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2d ed. 1993)
(stating the general principle that "[c]ommunity property is all property produced by la-
bor of either spouse during marriage").
104. See id.
105. See Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partnership The-
ory Through the Dual Classification System, 67 Miss. L.J. 115, 117-18 (1997).
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combines some of the elements of the community property system
with some from the title system. 10 6
Under the title system, marriage is a "union of economically sepa-
rate individuals."'10 7 When property is acquired, it is not acquired on
behalf of the marriage, but on behalf of the individual.'0 3 The title
system often awards men most of the assets of a marriage because he
was the wage earner and title holder. 10 9 Because of this inequity, no
state continues to use the title system for property division at divorce,
and most have converted to an equitable distribution system. 110
Under the equitable distribution system, states developed differ-
ent ways to determine which assets are marital assets."' A majority of
these states use an approach similar to the community property sys-
tem, which has both marital assets and separate assets. 112 Like some
community property states, 113 some equitable distribution states have
a presumption that the marital assets belong equally to wife and hus-
band. 114 Unfortunately, in common law states, equitable distribution
is often limited to dissolution of the marriage by divorce.1 15 If the
marriage terminates because of the death of one of the spouses, some
states revert back to the title system of property.'16 Most of these states
provide limited protection to the surviving spouse through elective
share statutes."17
D. Boggs v. Boggs
1. Factual Background
Dorothy and Isaac Boggs, residents of Louisiana, were married
for thirty years until Dorothy's death in 1979.118 In her will, Dorothy
106. See id. at 124.
107. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the
Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 73 (1993).
108. See LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAw 8 (1996).
109. See Bell, supra note 105, at 118.
110. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 479-80
(1999).
111. See Bell, supra note 105, at 125.
112. See BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.02, at 44 (2d ed.
1994).
113. SeeJ. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
§§ 13.02, 13-8.1 (1994).
114. See TURNER, supra note 112, § 5.03(5).
115. See Bell, supra note 105, at 130.
116. See id. at 130-31.
117. For a discussion of the elective share statute, see infra Part IV.D.
118. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463 (E.D. La. 1994), affd, 82 F.3d 90 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) [hereinafter Boggs 1].
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left one-third of her estate to her husband outright, and she left him a
lifetime usufruct t t 9 of the remaining two-thirds. 120 The remainder of
Isaac's lifetime usufruct was divided among their three sons. 121 The
usufruct included retirement benefits from Isaac's employer, South
Central Bell, that had accrued during Dorothy and Isaac's mar-
riage.' 22  Her half of the retirement benefits then vested,
$21,194.29,123 was included in Dorothy's gross estate. 124
In 1980, less than a year after Dorothy's death, Isaac married San-
dra. 125 Sandra and Isaac were married until he died in 1989.126 When
he retired in 1985, Isaac was entitled to various benefits from his em-
ployer's retirement plans. When Isaac died, his will gave his current
wife, Sandra, a lifetime usufruct in the remainder of his estate, which
included the retirement benefits and assets. 127 Isaac provided his
three sons with the remaining interest.1 28 Soon after Isaac's death, two
of his sons from his first marriage sued in a Louisiana state court re-
questing that the court appoint an expert to determine what amount
of the retirement benefits they were entitled to under their mother's
will. 129 Sandra then filed a complaint in federal court for a declaratory
judgment, asking the court to rule that ERISA preempted state law. 130
The district court held that under Louisiana's community prop-
erty laws, Dorothy owned a substantial interest in her husband's pen-
sion and retirement plans because they were married for thirty of the
thirty-six years that he was employed by South Central Bell.' 31 The
court decided that ERISA did not preempt Louisiana's community
property laws because they "were not specifically designed to affect
119. A usufruct is essentially the equivalent of a life estate. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
535 (West 1980).




124. See 26 U.S.C. § 2039(a) (1994). Section 2039(a) includes in the estate of the dece-
dent the value of an annuity if the decedent possessed the right to receive an annuity
payment during his or her lifetime, a period unascertainable without reference to dece-
dent's death, or for a period of time which does not end prior to death. See id. Because
Dorothy had the right to a joint and survivor annuity from Isaac's retirement plan, the
value of her right was included in her gross estate. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 97 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) [hereinafter Boggs I].
125. See Boggs 1, 849 F. Supp. at 463.
126. See id.






ERISA benefit plans."132 The court stated that Louisiana's community
property laws do not "relate to" an employee benefit plan as required
by ERISA's preemption provision. 133
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision. 3 4 In deter-
mining if ERISA's preemption provision was triggered, the appellate
court engaged in a two-part analysis. 135 First, the court considered
whether the state law at issue "involve[d] an exercise of traditional
state authority." 136 The court determined that laws governing the ac-
quisition and ownership of property during marriage were an exercise
of traditional state authority.'3 7
Next, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the state law "af-
fect[ed] relations among the principal ERISA entities-the employer,
the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the beneficiaries" or whether it only
"affect[ed] relations between one of these entities and an outside
party" or "two outside parties with only an incidental effect on the
plan." 38 The court held that Louisiana's "community property laws
[were] not sufficiently 'related to' an employee benefit plan" because
nothing was sought from the plan or its fiduciary nor was a duty im-
posed on the plan or the administrator. 39 The court held that its de-
cision related to "the disposition of the proceeds only after payment
to the designated beneficiary" not to the plan itself.140
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
ERISA preempted community property laws as to the testamentary
transfer of retirement benefits by a predeceasing non-participant
spouse. 141 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that ERISA pre-
empted application of Louisiana community property laws, which
would have allowed a first wife to make a testamentary transfer of her
interests in her survivor's annuity and in her husband's retirement
benefits.142
132. Id. at 465.
133. See id.
134. See Boggs II, 82 F.3d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
135. See id. at 95.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 96.
138. Id. at 95-96.
139. Id. at 96-97.
140. Id. at 97.
141. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997).
142. See id. at 841.
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Before the Supreme Court concluded that ERISA preempted the
state's marital disposition law, the Court attempted to determine ER-
ISA's purpose. The Court considered ERISA as it was amended by
REA and concluded that the purpose was to protect the plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries. 143 The Court erroneously determined that be-
cause the state's community property laws frustrate this purpose,
ERISA preempted these laws. 144
The Court concluded that the purpose behind the requirements
that REA added to ERISA was to provide a stream of income to partici-
pants and beneficiaries. 45 Since a surviving spouse is guaranteed to
receive at least 50% of the QJSA when her husband dies, any attempt
to decrease that amount would frustrate the purpose of the 50% re-
quirement. 146 The Court decided that the goal of this provision was to
protect the surviving spouse, granting her a certain level of income. 147
Allowing the first wife to bequeath her share would reduce the
amount of income available to the second wife. 148 An ex-spouse,
through a QDRO, could be entitled to receive part of the surviving
spouse's share of the annuity. 149
Next, the Court looked at the anti-alienation provision of ERISA.
It determined that the purpose of this section was to assure the partici-
pants and beneficiaries that retirement funds would be available at
retirement. 150 The Court found that Congress intended to preempt
non-beneficiary non-participant interests with this anti-alienation
provision.' 5 '
The Court then examined the effect of the QDRO provision on
ERISA's anti-alienation section. The Court determined the purpose of
this amendment was to provide a stream of income as well. 152 The
QDRO provision was viewed as a limited exception to the anti-aliena-
tion provision.153 The Court believed that a first wife's bequest of the
right to a QJSA or other retirement benefits would be an assignment
or alienation, which would be prohibited by ERISA.154 A probate
143. See id. at 845.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 843.
146. See id. at 843-44.
147. See id. at 843.
148. See id. at 844.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 852.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 839.
154. See id. at 851.
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court order enforcing the bequest would not qualify as a QDRO be-
cause the order would not deal with domestic relations.1 55 Therefore,
any bequest of a retirement benefit would be a prohibited assignment
or alienation.1 56
The Court then noted that pensions are designed for the benefit
of the living.1 57 According to the majorityj Congress' fundamental in-
tent, which was evident throughout ERISA, was to insure that both
spouses would receive sufficient funds to afford them security during
their lifetimes. 158 The Court concluded that inherent in this goal of
protecting plan participants and beneficiaries by providing a stream of
income in the retirement years was a social policy of favoring the liv-
ing over the dead.159 Because Sandra was alive and in need of support,
allowing Dorothy's bequest of her property right would limit the
amount of support available to Sandra.1 60 Therefore, the Court held
that Louisiana's community property law, which allowed Dorothy to
make her bequest, must be preempted by ERISA because it frustrated
the purpose of ERISA.161
II. Purpose of ERISA
When enacting ERISA, Congress took great care to enumerate its
reasons for doing so. By examining the structure of ERISA, its lan-
guage, and the history surrounding its enactment, the purpose of pro-
tecting plan participants and beneficiaries is clear. However, that
purpose was limited in its scope to protecting participants and benefi-
ciaries from their employers and/or plan administrators.1 62 The Boggs
decision erroneously extended the scope of protection beyond ER-
ISA's original intent and text.
155. See id. at 849.
156. See id. at 851.
157. See id. at 854; see also Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that ERISA preempts nonemployee spouse's possible property right in employee
spouse's pension under California community property law). The court in Ablamis stated,
"Pensions are designed for the benefit of the living." 937 F.2d at 1457.
158. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1457.
159. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. at 854.
160. See id. at 844.
161. See id. at 841.
162. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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A. Purpose of ERISA at Enactment
The text of ERISA's section 1001 (a) states Congress' purpose in
enacting ERISA.1 63 The text of the purpose section stresses the impor-
tance of disclosure, minimum standards for pension plans, and finan-
cial soundness. 164 Inherent in this language is the intent to protect
plan participants and beneficiaries. Looking at this language, it dem-
onstrates that participants and beneficiaries need to be protected
from their employers and/or plan administrators. Therefore, when
enacting ERISA, Congress focused only on protection against abuses
by the administrators of the plans.
The history surrounding the enactment of ERISA enforces this
view of its purpose. As discussed earlier, ERISA was a reaction to
abuses by plan administrators or employers, which left participants
and beneficiaries without any benefits or limited benefits upon retire-
ment.165 Companies had closed and pension plans were eliminated.1 66
Workers who had put money into plans were denied their benefits
because they did not meet the stringent vesting requirements. 16 7 The
legislative history rarely discusses the need for participants to be pro-
tected from themselves. What the legislative history indicates is a need
for participants and beneficiaries to be protected from their employ-
ers and plan administrators.
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (1994). Section 1001(a) provides:
The Congress finds . .. that the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; . . . that
owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning
their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their benefi-
ciaries, and to provide for the general welfare . . . that disclosure be made and
safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and adminis-
tration of such plans; . . . that despite the enormous growth in such plans many
employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement bene-
fits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inade-
quacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that ow-
ing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated,
employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and
that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries,
... that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such
plans and their financial soundness.
Id.
164. See id.
165. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
166. See David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective
Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 427, 444 n.55 (1987).
167. See id. at 443-45.
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Congress' purpose was "the establishment of certain minimum
standards to which all private pension plans must conform if the pri-
vate pension promise is to become real rather than illusory." 168 Con-
gress' effort was designed to protect the long-term employee
participating in and contributing to a pension plan who would other-
wise lose his or her benefits. 169 Congress wanted to reduce the adverse
pension effects of plant closings and bankruptcy on workers. 170 Con-
gress' goals with ERISA were to "eliminate or substantially reduce un-
duly restrictive qualification requirements . . . reduce the probability
of self-serving actions by pension fund administrators and trustees...
reduce the likelihood that such funds will go broke, and provide in-
surance against the possibility that they may."'17
Scrutiny of the structure of ERISA further reinforces this limita-
tion on the protections of ERISA. Parts one through five of ERISA are
relevant to pension plans and retirement benefits.' 72 Part one pro-
vides reporting and disclosure requirements.173 Part two establishes
ERISA participation and vesting requirements. 174 Part three sets mini-
mum funding standards. 75 Part four describes the fiduciary responsi-
bilities of the plan administrators.176 Finally, part five discusses the
administration and enforcement of these protections. 177 These five
parts of ERISA all impact plan administration and seek to regulate
plan administrators.
Even the anti-alienation provision of ERISA17 does not demon-
strate that Congress' intent was to protect participants and benefi-
ciaries from a bequest of a beneficiary's interest. This section permits
168. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, U.S. SENATE, COM-
MITFEE ON WAYS AND MEANs, 93D CONG., REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 2924, 3306 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
ERISA REPORT]. Underlying the provisions of ERISA, Congress recognized the need for a
comprehensive legislative program dealing not only with malfeasance and maladministra-
tion in the plans, or the consequences of lack of inadequate vesting, but also with the
broad spectrum of questions such as adequacy of funding and adequate communication to
participants. See id.
169. See id. at 3369 (statement of Mr. Perkins, the Representative from Kentucky and
Chairman of the full Committee on Education and Labor).
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. For a description of the parts of ERISA, see supra Part II.A.1.b.
173. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
174. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1060 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
175. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082-1085 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
176. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1113 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
177. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1147 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
178. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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loans to participants and beneficiaries. 179 It also permits voluntary and
revocable assignments of up to 10% of distributions.180 These excep-
tions suggest that Congress was not trying to prevent the participant
or the beneficiaries from divesting themselves or each other of pen-
sion benefits. Instead, it suggests that Congress was preventing plan
administrators from dealing with a creditor's claims against the
benefits.
But was Congress concerned about a participant divesting them-
selves prior to retirement? In its report to the Senate, the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare did not indicate that alienation prior to
retirement was a major issue."8 That was only a minor concern of
Congress. The anti-alienation issue was raised during the discussions
about vesting benefits. 8 2 Congress was more concerned with plan ad-
ministrators abusing assignments and alienations to divest participants
of those benefits that had vested.'8 3 In discussing alienation, the Com-
mittee indicated that a garnishment or a levy would not be a voluntary
assignment. 8 4 If the garnishment or levy was not a voluntary assign-
ment, it would be an alienation in violation of ERISA. This sheds some
light on what Congress might have meant by adding the anti-aliena-
tion provision. Congress wanted the employee to be protected from
having his or her retirement benefits garnished or levied. 185
B. Effect of REA Amendments on the Purpose of ERISA
How did the REA amendments to ERISA affect its purpose? Did
these amendments extend the scope of ERISA's protection beyond its
original purpose? The Supreme Court in Boggs stated that "[t] he statu-
tory object of the qualified joint and survivor annuity provisions, along
with the rest of [section] 1055, is to ensure a stream of income to
surviving spouses."' 8 6 Overall, the QJSA and QPSA amendments seem
designed to guarantee or protect a non-participant spouse's interest.
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) (1994).
180. See id.
181. See S. REP. No. 93-127 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4844-47.
182. See ERISA REPORT, supra note 168, at 3505, 3552 (noting Representative Griffiths'
statements about the removal of income from the tax stream-the only discussion of a
stream of income in the legislative history of ERISA).
183. See Gordon, supra note 32, at 17-20.
184. See S. REP. No. 93-383 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890.
185. See id.
186. Boggs 111, 520 U.S. 833, 843 (1997).
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Who is section 1055 geared toward? This section states what bene-
fits a plan is required to provide.'8 7 The only difference between a
QJSA and QPSA is the timing of the death of the participant. The
purpose of the QJSA is to protect a spouse in the event of the prema-
ture death of the participant after retirement.1 8 The purpose of the
QPSA is to prevent forfeiture of vested benefits if the participant dies
before retirement. 89 Nothing about the QJSA or QPSA requirements
suggests expanding the purpose of ERISA beyond protection from
plan administrators.
Another REA amendment added the QDRO requirement to ER-
ISA's anti-alienation provision. What was Congress' purpose in passing
the QDRO provision? A Senate report indicates that the purpose of
the QDRO exception was to "clarif [y] that such order does not result
in a prohibited assignment or alienation of benefits."190 This provision
demonstrates that Congress did not want ERISA to preempt commu-
nity property laws. The Senate Finance Committee explained that
those state laws, which provide for the rights (community property
laws), would continue to be exempt from ERISA. 191 If these laws were
going to continue to be exempt, then they must have been exempt
prior to REA. If Congress did not want ERISA to preempt community
property laws in the event of a divorce, why would it want to preempt
in the event of death?
Furthermore, the existence of the QDRO exception cannot sug-
gest that Congress wanted to preempt marital property laws, because
these laws are the source of the property right that entitles a woman to
obtain a QDRO. The QDRO is just the mechanism Congress selected
through which women are able to exercise their state created property
rights in the event of a divorce. It was not Congress' intent to trump
all application of state community property laws and inject its own
property regime. This is evidenced by the fact that nothing in the
QDRO provisions creates a property right or establishes a federal
property regime. 19 2
Congress' intent was to protect pension plan administrators from
inconsistent or vague state court orders and having to pay double
187. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Erica S. Phillips, Note, Equality in Life, Inequality in Death: The Ramifications of the
United States Supreme Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34 IDAHo L. REV 623, 643 (1998).
191. See S. REP. No. 98-575, at 19 (1984).
192. The legislative history and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (3) (1994) do not contain language
that creates a property right.
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claims. 193 The QDRO provisions of ERISA are merely a checklist for
judges to use so that a plan administrator knows who and when to
pay. 194 This legislation, like the other ERISA regulations, was aimed at
the plan administrators and not the beneficiaries. Neither REA's legis-
lative history nor the statutory language of the QDRO demonstrates
that Congress intended to completely occupy the field of property law
upon the termination of the marriage by either death or divorce.
The Boggs decision impermissibly extended ERISA's scope be-
yond protection from plan administrators' abuses 195 to protecting the
beneficiaries from the plan participants' 96 and other beneficiaries. Be-
cause ERISA's purpose was to protect and secure pension benefits and
not to change basic property rights, the Court stripped Dorothy and
other women like her of a valuable opportunity to provide for their
heirs.
III. Preemption of State Marital Laws by ERISA
When Congress enacted ERISA it was aware that some state laws
would need to be superseded by federal law if ERISA was to work.
Therefore, Congress provided a preemption section within ERISA. 19 7
The language of section 1144 is broad and has provided the Court
with many opportunities to determine when ERISA preempts state
law. 198
The Boggs majority found that it was not possible to comply with
both ERISA and state community property laws.' 9 9 However, ERISA's
preemption provision refers to state laws relating to "employee benefit
plans," not those relating to "employee benefits."200 A state commu-
nity property law does not, on its face, appear to conflict with ERISA's
goals and objectives. Community property laws do not purport to reg-
193. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 558.
194. See id.
195. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
196. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833, 859 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (providing that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
198. The Court has dealt with numerous cases dealing with ERISA's preemption stat-
ute. However, because Boggs departs from those cases using a different theory of preemp-
tion, those cases will be discussed only as they relate to the erroneous decision in Boggs. For
further information on these cases, see Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The
Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REv. 1 (2000) and
Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the
Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996).
199. See Boggs 111, 520 U.S. at 844.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
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ulate pension plans, either directly or indirectly.201 Community prop-
erty laws merely determine who owns the benefits once the benefits
have been distributed.
The Boggs Court reasoned that if ERISA did not preempt commu-
nity property laws, these laws would make the wife a co-equal partici-
pant.20 2 But the Court ignores the REA amendments which do treat
the non-participant spouse as a co-equal participant. REA gave women
rights in their husbands' retirement benefits by requiring that the
plan provide a joint and survivor annuity, providing the wife with at
least half of the annuity amount after her participant husband dies.20 3
It gave women ownership rights by requiring the wife's consent for the
husband to name a beneficiary other than her.20 4 However, according
to the Court, those ownership rights do not survive her.205 A woman
loses her ownership interest in her husband's retirement benefits
upon her death, because the Court thought that ERISA has a social
policy of favoring the living over the dead.20 6
The Court's belief that Congress chose to favor the living over the
dead is disingenuous. Nothing in the language or legislative history of
ERISA or REA states that Congress wanted to favor the living over the
dead. Society will not benefit if Congress accepts this assigned social
policy as its intent behind enacting ERISA.
IV. Negative Effects of Preemption and Imposition of
Federal Policy Choices on Marriage and Women
If it is possible to read into the intent of Congress in creating
ERISA this overarching policy of favoring the living over the dead has
very troubling social policy implications. This social policy would be a
disservice to women and their rights. It reinforces the belief that a wife
is only entitled to enough property to support herself. Furthermore,
this policy encourages a society, where a majority of marriages already
end in divorce, to end its marriages in order to protect a property
right.
"Women are one-half the world's people; they do two-thirds of
the world's work; they earn one-tenth of the world's income; they own
201. See Paul E. Mansur, ERISA Preemption, Community Property, and the Nonemployee
Spouse: A Study in Confused Equities, 30 Hous. L. Rv. 1695, 1700 (1993).
202. See Boggs II1, 520 U.S. at 852-53.
203. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
204. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(C) (1994).
205. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. at 853.
206. See id. at 854.
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one one-hundredth of the world's property."207 Women in the United
States are still faced with discrimination based on their gender in the
twenty-first century. The Internal Revenue Code penalizes working
middle class mothers and wives by suggesting that a woman's place is
in the home.2°8 The current private retirement system often "blatantly
discriminates" against women in several aspects. 20 9 The Supreme
Court in Boggs reinforced and perpetuated a system that flagrantly de-
clares a woman's place is in the home and then punishes her when
she chooses to be there. Recognition of a woman's co-ownership in
her husband's retirement benefits is a necessary element of recogniz-
ing equality in married, life.
A. Disparate Impact on Women
The Supreme Court slapped women in the face with its decision
in Boggs.210 Although the decision in Boggs appears to be facially neu-
tral, it has disparate results. A large number of the women who are at
the age of retirement, or nearing that age now, are women who opted
to stay home and raise their children instead of working.21' In the
1960s and 1970s, these women relied upon the income of their hus-
bands to support their family. As housewives and mothers, they had
no retirement plan. They must share in their husbands' retirement
207. Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equality and Tax Policy: The Theory of "Taxing Men", 6 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 485, 485 (1997) (quoting PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOL GIRLS:
YOUNG WOMEN, SELF-ESTEEM, AND THE CONFIDENCE GAP 247 (1994)).
208. See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971) (discussing the marriage penalties
introduced by the 1969 tax act and describing the income tax law as perpetuating a pattern
of work disincentives for married women); see also Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gen-
derEssentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469, 1485 (1997)
(discussing the bias in federal tax laws based on race, class, and gender and arguing that by
abolishing the joint income tax return "[w]ives would no longer be discouraged from
working in the paid labor force").
209. Camilla E. Watson, The Pension Game: Age- and Gender-Based Inequities in the Retire-
ment System, 25 GA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (arguing that the coverage, participation, vesting,
and other ERISA requirements fail to adequately account for women's roles and exper-
iences in the workforce, which leave few women eligible to participate and even fewer
women receiving sufficient benefits).
210. This Article will discuss the disproportionate effect this ruling has on women. Al-
though it can affect men as well, the reality is that the majority of the primary care provid-
ers are mothers and not fathers. See Kristen Keith & Abagail McWilliams, The Returns to
Mobility and Job Search by Gender, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 260, 474 (1999).
211. In 1961, only 38% of women age sixteen and over participated in the labor mar-
ket. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Impact of Social Security Reform on
Women's Economic Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 375, 406 & n.20 (1999).
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benefits and Social Security benefits. 212 Although the participation of
women in the labor market has increased dramatically over the years,
in 1996 only 59% of women age sixteen or older participated in the
work force compared to 75% of men. 21 3 Women will continue to par-
ticipate less in pension plans for various reasons: they sometimes leave
their jobs to raise children; they tend to work in industries that offer
no or few pension benefits; and they often work only part-time and do
not meet the minimum hours requirement to participate in most pen-
sion plans.2 14 Additionally, when married women with minor children
are employed, it is often out of necessity.215 These women are less able
to defer current income until retirement because they need it for con-
sumption now. 2 16
Given the disparity among the salaries of men versus women, 217
when women do participate in pension plans their contributions are
often less than their male peers. If a woman earning $25,000 a year
elects to defer 3% of her current income to her pension plan, that
deferral will result in a smaller retirement benefit than the 3% contri-
bution of her male peers earning $35,000. By denying a woman an
ownership interest in her husband's retirement benefits, society limits
her ability to provide for her heirs. Although she has made monetary
and non-monetary contributions to her husband's ability to contrib-
ute to his retirement benefits, she is stripped of the ability to share its
rewards if she predeceases her husband.
B. Devalues a Woman's Contribution to Her Family
Those women who elect to forego a career or start a career after
raising their children will not have much of a legacy to leave their
heirs if they happen to predecease their husbands. The largest asset of
212. See id. at 381. When Social Security was enacted in 1939, only a handful of women
worked outside the home. See id.
213. See id. at 379-80.
214. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 28.
215. See Ayla A. Lari, Sharing Alike: French Family Taxation as a Model for Reform, 37 DuQ.
L. REv. 207, 224 (1999).
216. See Jean H. Baker, Child Care: Will Uncle Sam Provide a Comprehensive Solution for
American Families?, 6J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 239, 240 (1990).
217. See Margaret Mooney Marini & Pi-Ling Fan, The Gender Gap in Earnings at Career
Entry, 62 Am. Soc. REV. 588, 597 (1997) (discussing how women in sample earned 84% of
what men earned at career entry); see also Edward J. McCaffery, Equality, of the Right Sort, 6
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 289, 294 (1996); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women's Earnings as Percent of
Men's, 1979-1999, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/wb/public/wbpubs/7996.htm (last visited
July 20, 2000) (containing statistics of women's earnings as a percentage of men's)
(hardcopy of web page on file with the author).
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most marriages is the retirement benefits of the working spouse 218
When both spouses are working, the husband's retirement benefits
tend to be larger because he did not take time off to raise children. 219
With REA, Congress attempted to take into account these differ-
ences. Congress began its discussion of REA with Geraldine Ferraro's
comment: "Women are shortchanged by private pension plans be-
cause the system does not truly recognize the contributions that wo-
men make to the economy or take into account women's unique work
patterns, patterns which revolve around childrearing and other family
responsibilities. "220
The Supreme Court interpreted ERISA in a way that suggests wo-
men's contributions to their families are worth less than the contribu-
tions of their husbands. This interpretation ignores the fact that the
"principal reason married men are capable of reaping large salaries in
the workplace is due to the level of support they receive from their
wives at home."22 1
If a woman does not have the right to make a testamentary trans-
fer of her right in her husband's plan benefits, then her right does not
vest until he retires or dies. The only other way for a woman to be
assured of receiving her interest is to divorce her husband and obtain
a QDRO, which she can then present to her husband's pension plan
administrator to obtain her share. In effect, the wife is granted a con-
tingent life estate in her husband's retirement benefits, while he has a
full-fledged property interest-fee simple absolute.
These limitations reinforce the idea that a woman is only entitled
to her share of her husband's pension plan if she needs it for her
support. And dead women need no support. This policy ignores the
fact that a wife makes a valuable contribution to her family, via domes-
tic chores and childrearing, that do not result in monetary rewards. If
a woman must survive her husband in order to take her share, then
the policy is that the woman only gets her share because she needs it.
218. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833, 840 (1997); see also In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d
561, 566 (1976).
219. See Burke & McCouch, supra note 211, at 380 ("Women may continue to increase
their participation in the work force, but they will remain more likely than men to work
intermittently or part-time.").
220. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 549 (citing Pension Equity for Women Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Labor Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
98th Cong. 26 (1983) (comments of Rep. Geraldine Ferraro made when the bill, which
eventually became the REA, was introduced)).
221. Shurtz, supra note 207, at 516.
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And she needs it because her husband is no longer alive to provide
her support or is no longer married to her.
C. Violates the Theory of Marriage As an Economic Partnership
Both family and tax law theories acknowledge that marriage is
like a partnership. 222 The modern theory of marriage is that marriage
is an economic partnership where both husband and wife combine
resources to the benefit of both. 223 This theory recognizes that the
financial aspect of marriage is one of profit-sharing. 224 Sometimes it is
portrayed "as an expression of the presumed intent of husbands and
wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share and share
alike." 225 For policy reasons, society wants to encourage this partner-
ship framework because it advocates mutual commitments between
spouses and serves broader societal objectives regarding the caring for
children and elderly dependents. 226 The modern view or partnership
theory also promotes gender equality.2 2 7
The partnership model of marriage can also mitigate the continu-
ance of gender biases in both the home and outside world. 228 It takes
into account the partners' allocation of domestic responsibilities and
society's allocation of salaries and benefits.229 A combination of all the
partners' resources disperses "the risks and benefits of sex-linked
roles." 230
The purpose of the partnership model is not only to reward the
spouse of a long-term marriage who sacrifices "financial-earning op-
portunities" in order to provide domestic services to the marriage, but
also to deny a windfall to the spouse in whose name the assets were
mostly titled. 231 However, in the case of shorter, late-in-life marriages,
the partnership model should curtail the windfall of the spouse who
222. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage
in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (1996).
223. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21,
42 (1994).
224. See id.
225. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw 131 (1989).
226. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 198-99 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
227. See id.
228. See Waggoner, supra note 223, at 44.
229. See id.
230. Rhode & Minow, supra note 226, at 198-99.
231. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under
the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV 223, 241 (1991).
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happens to live the longest.232 In these shorter marriages, it is unlikely
that either spouse contributed significantly to the other's wealth. 233
When Congress amended ERISA by providing for a qualified
joint and survivor annuity and qualified domestic relations orders, it
recognized that marriage is like a partnership. 23 4 Each spouse is con-
sidered to make equal contributions to the partnership. 235 Thus, Con-
gress sought to provide non-participant spouses with rights and
benefits in their spouses' retirement benefits.
The Boggs decision rejects the partnership theory of marriage by
treating the pension plan assets as belonging to the husband. By pre-
empting community property laws with ERISA, a woman has no rights
until her husband dies, retires, or they divorce, even though the con-
tribution to the retirement account is in part hers.236 In effect, pre-
emption strips the non-participant spouse of any property right in her
spouse's retirement pension unless she chooses to divorce the work-
ing spouse. 237 The Boggs decision interferes with the spousal equality
that REA sought to achieve.
In effect, the decision in Boggs distorts a state's marital property
system by fashioning one spouse's share of the gains during the mar-
riage into a larger share than that of the other spouse.2 38 It is very rare
that one spouse will have a pension benefit equal in value to that of
the other spouse. 239 In effect, the Boggs Court has suggested to wives
that they must end their marriage to obtain their partnership benefits
of marriage.
Historically, women were allocated part of the marital wealth
based upon a theory of dependency.240 Women were awarded alimony
and other marital assets, because, as women, they were dependent
upon their husbands for support.241 In contrast, the modern theory
232. See id. at 242.
233. See id.
234. See Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
235. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in Amer-
ican Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 396.
236. See Boggs 111, 520 U.S. 833, 836 (1997).
237. See id.
238. If a wife's right in her husband's retirement benefits does not vest until he dies or
retires, then essentially the benefits are all his until he dies or retires.
239. As discussed earlier, if women are entitled to pension benefits from their em-
ployer, for various reasons, the amount of their benefits will often be less than that of their
husbands. See supra Part W.A.
240. See Fineman, supra note 235, at 397.
241. See Robin J. Davis, Alimony and Equitable Distribution: Are the Two Concepts Commin-
gled in West Virginia?, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 469, 469-70 (1992-1993).
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for allocation of marital wealth recognizes the contributions women
have made to the family.242 Their contribution in maintaining the
home and raising children justifies their share of the partnership as-
sets at dissolution.243 This contribution should also justify their share
at termination by death. 244 This economic justification recognizes that
women who serve in the role of mother/housewife also make impor-
tant contributions to the marriage, and that their contributions are
worth more than a mere inter-vivos reward. 245
D. Imposes the Title System of Ownership
"In the United States, a [testator's] spouse is the only relative who
is protected against intentional disinheritance." 246 Most states have
adopted an elective share statute based upon the Uniform Probate
Code ("UPC"),247 which permits a surviving spouse to elect to take a
statutory percentage or share of her husband's estate. 248 Georgia is
the only non-community property state that does not have an elective
share statute.2 4 9 An elective share statute is not required in a commu-
nity property state because each spouse gets a vested one-half interest
in the property acquired during the marriage.2 50
Boggs reinforces the title system of property upon death because
the Court failed to recognize that a woman has a vested property right
in her husband's retirement benefits. If a woman does not have a
vested property interest in her husband's retirement benefits, then
women are dependent upon their husband's retirement plan provid-
ing an annuity benefit to which ERISA grants a contingent life estate
242. See Bartlett, supra note 110, at 479.
243. See Fineman, supra note 235, at 397.
244. If it fails to recognize the contribution upon death, then the society is still limiting
the property rights of women to support only. We can only escape this problem by allowing
the property rights to survive her death.
245. SeeJana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Eco-
nomic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2435 (1994). Singer argues that the wo-
man's contribution is worth compensation at dissolution of the marriage. See id. This
Article extends her argument to the proposition that the contribution is worth compensa-
tion at the termination of the marriage as well.
246. Waggoner, supra note 223, at 41-42.
247. See Newman, supra note 102, at 489-90 (stating that the UPC's general objective is
an equal division of the couple's marital property and no division of their separate
property).
248. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1993).
249. See American College of Trust & Estate Counsel (ACTEC), Study 10: Surviving
Spouse's Rights to Share in Deceased Spouse's Estate (1994).
250. See W.S. MCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 11.4, at
510-11 (1982); see also LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAmiLY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 520 (2d ed. 1997).
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to the wife. If the retirement plan does not provide an annuity benefit,
the only protection against disinheritance that a woman has is her
elective share, which is not available to women in community property
states.
Almost every state recognizes marriage as a partnership. 25' How-
ever, the elective share statute was required for common law states
because common law property rights vested only in the spouse whose
name the property was titled. 252 Since the title to property was most
often in the name of the husband, upon his death he had the ability
to give the property to anyone he chose. Elective share statutes permit
common law states to give deference to marital partnership princi-
ples, 253 while maintaining separate property principles254 and the au-
tonomy of the individual. 255 These elective share statutes demonstrate
society's acknowledgment that a surviving spouse has some claim to
the assets of the marriage. 256
Upon her husband's death, the surviving spouse may elect to take
under her husband's will or she may elect to receive a statutorily pre-
scribed percentage of her husband's estate.2 57 The percentage to
which she can elect depends upon the length of the marriage, but can
never exceed 50% of the husband's estate.258
This percentage is applied against the augmented estate259 to de-
termine a dollar amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled.260
The dollar amount (elective share amount) is then reduced by the
251. See Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68
TEX. L. REv. 689, 696 (1990).
252. SeeJohn H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced
Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 306 (1987) (arguing that the purpose of the
elective share statute was "to correct the failure of a separate property state to create the
appropriate lifetime rights for spouses in each other's earnings").
253. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (amended 1993) (noting that the
main purpose of changes in the elective share "[was] to bring elective-share laws in line
with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership").
254. See Smith, supra note 251, at 707 (arguing that "community-property states adopt-
ing the partnership theory emphasized the wife's separate legal existence and her right to
own property while de-emphasizing the notion of commonly owned property").
255. See Note, The Revised UPC Elective Share: Missing Essential Partnership Principles, 13
QUINNIPAC PROB. L.J. 225, 226 (1998) [hereinafter Partnership Principles].
256. See id. at 238.
257. For purposes of discussion, the Uniform Probate Code's elective share statues will
be used.
258. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1993).
259. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (amended 1993). The augmented estate includes
the probate estate, certain nonprobate transfers made by the deceased spouse and/or the
surviving spouse, and property owned by the surviving spouse. See id.
260. See Newman, supra note 102, at 506-07.
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surviving spouse's own property261 and property she received from the
decedent.262 Any remaining elective share amount is the amount that
she may take of her husband's estate. 263
For example, if husband and wife were married for eleven years
when the husband died, and his will left all of his property to his chil-
dren, under the UPC, the wife is entitled to 34% of the augmented
estate. 264 He dies with a probate estate of $500,000 and a life insur-
ance policy of $150,000, which names her as the beneficiary. She owns
property worth $50,000 and has not made any non-probate transfers.
The augmented estate is $700,000. The dollar amount to which she is
entitled is $238,000. This elective share amount is reduced by the
amount of property she owns ($50,000) and the amount of property
he gave her ($150,000 life insurance). The elective share amount that
the wife may obtain from her husband's estate is $38,000.
Forcing women to rely upon their states' elective share statutes
poses significant problems. The elective share statutes fail in their at-
tempts to treat marriage as a partnership. The statutes require a wo-
man to not only survive her husband in order to share in the marital
property, but also she must affirmatively act to obtain her property
rights. These statutes are based upon invalid or outdated assumptions.
Additionally, the statutes are designed in such a way that enables a
husband to easily limit his wife's access and rights to the marital prop-
erty after his death.
However, the elective share system does produce results consis-
tent with the marital partnership theory upon which it is based.265 The
intent of the elective share statutes is to prevent disinheritance and
provide support for the surviving spouse. 266 Elective share statutes are
not intended to be the means for the allocation of assets amassed dur-
ing the marriage. 267 Such use can produce inequitable results in long-
term marriages. 268
261. This includes property she owns and nonprobate transfers made by the surviving
spouse to others that would have been included in her augmented estate had she been the
decedent.
262. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-209 (amended 1993).
263. For a more detailed explanation, see Newman, supra note 102, at 507.
264. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1993).
265. See Newman, supra note 102, at 488.
266. See Partnership Principles, supra note 255, at 247.
267. See Susan N. Gary, The UPC's Elective Share: Share and Share Alike?, 19 PROB. & PROP.
A.B.A. J. 18, 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1998).
268. See Newman, supra note 102, at 521.
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The amount that the surviving spouse is entitled to under the
elective share statute may be inadequate. Professor Helene Shapo ar-
gues that the elective share statutes of most states do not go far
enough to protect women because these statutes do not take into ac-
count whether or not the surviving spouse is raising minor chil-
dren. 269 Even though the elective share is maximized at 50%,
Professor Shapo notes that a woman raising children may need more
than half of her deceased husband's estate. 270
Although the elective share is based in part on the partnership
theory of marriage, the right to a portion of the marital property does
not arise until one spouse dies. 27' The elective share statutes do not
change who holds title to property; property ownership resides with
the titleholder.27 2 For the non-titled spouse to obtain her "fair share,"
she must survive her husband. 273
The elective share statutes are based on assumptions that are no
longer valid or accurate. First, the purpose of elective share statutes is
to prevent the intentional disinheritance of the surviving spouse.274
This assumes that decedents would disinherit their spouses absent
these statutes. 275 This assumption may no longer be realistic.276 If
spousal disinheritance is not a problem, then the elective share system
does more harm than good.
277
Additionally, the elective share statutes are based upon a narrow
view of what constitutes a family. The elective share assumes that a
family is two heterosexual, married parents and their children, unaf-
fected by divorce and remarriage. 278 This traditional family may no
longer exist.2 79
269. See Helene S. Shapo, "A Tale of Two Systems": Anglo-American Problems in the Moderni-
zation of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 707, 725-33 (1993).
270. See id. at 728.
271. See Gary, supra note 267, at 21.
272. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt. (amended 1993); see also Mary Louise Fel-
lows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers", 10 LAw & INEQ. J. 137, 151 (1991).
273. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt. (amended 1993); see also Fellows, supra note
272, at 151.
274. See Partnership Principles, supra note 255, at 247.
275. See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
83, 141 (1994).
276. See MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 86-95 (1970). In
more than 85% of the estates surveyed, the testator bequeathed everything to the surviving
spouse. See id. at 89.
277. See Brashier, supra note 275, at 141.
278. See id. at 148.
279. In 1985, only 27.9% of American households consisted of a married couple and
their own children under the age of eighteen. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
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One of the most severe defects in elective share statutes is that a
decedent may satisfy his obligation to his surviving spouse by giving
her an income interest for her life in the marital property.280 These
statutes28' allow the use of a life estate to defeat a surviving spouse's
right to control a share of the marital property.282
E. Encourages Divorce and Discourages Marriage
The social policy of favoring the living over the dead creates a
tension between death and divorce. A woman who divorces her hus-
band has very different property rights than if she dies before he does.
Because of the vast difference in result depending upon how the mar-
riage ends, a wife's property rights are treated as inferior to her hus-
band's rights.
When a woman divorces her husband, the divorce court can
award the wife a portion of her husband's retirement benefits. 2 3 State
marital property laws will determine the extent of the woman's inter-
est in her husband's retirement benefits.2 84 This award will be in the
form of a qualified domestic relations order so that she can present it
to her ex-husband's retirement plan to enforce her property right.
2 85
Under the Supreme Court's holding in Boggs, when a woman pre-
deceases her husband, state marital property laws that gave her an
interest at divorce are preempted.28 6 She is not able to bequeath her
share of her husband's retirement benefits because upon her death
she no longer has any property rights in the benefits. 287 Because she
has no rights at death, she in effect has no control over the property.
Therefore, in order to have an enforceable property right and con-
trol, the woman must survive her husband or divorce him.
Mary Louise Fellows argues that laws that have given women
rights to property have not changed the power relationship with
STATES 1987, tbl. 61 (107th ed. 1987). This percentage includes both families where the
children are the children of both parents and children of only one parent; therefore, the
percentage of traditional families is lower.
280. See Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax
Law Provides a Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 567, 568 (1995).
281. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 907 (1995).
282. See Gary, supra note 280, at 568.
283. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1994). The court achieves this allocation by comply-
ing with the QDRO provisions of ERISA. See supra Part I.A.5.c.
284. See supra Part I.B.
285. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (3).
286. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833, 841-42 (1997).
287. See id.
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men. 28 8 The disparate result created by this social policy reinforces
her argument. Men, as the family breadwinners, still control the mari-
tal property. Essentially, the only way for women to gain control over
the property short of divorce is to outlive their husbands. Professor
Fellows states that by recognizing a woman's claim to marital assets
only if she survives her husband is consistent with "the maintenance
(or vessel) ideology of the fourteenth century."289 This policy denies
women the right to testamentary control, unless "practicality de-
mands" it.290
Why would society allow a woman to have an interest upon di-
vorce but not upon her death? Society's concerns are vastly different
in the protection of property rights at death than they are at divorce.
Society's concern at the dissolution of a marriage is the support of the
spouse and minor children. 29 1 A divorce court wants to allocate mari-
tal property in a manner that provides for the support of the spouse
and rewards her for her contribution to the marital assets. This con-
cern for support after a divorce is the cornerstone in the social policy
of favoring the living over the dead.29 2
However, support is not the only concern society has in regulat-
ing the transfer of property at death. Laws that regulate the transfer of
property at death are often described as "an attempt to express the
family in terms of property."29 3 The goals of most succession laws are:
(1) maintaining the regime of private property;29 4 (2) effectuating the
wishes of the individual property owner;295 (3) providing for the well-
being of the family;296 (4) providing for the well-being of society;29 7
and (5) discharging the decedent's debts and protecting creditors. 298
288. See Fellows, supra note 272, at 141-42.
289. Id. at 151. Professor Fellows argues that in the fourteenth century women were
viewed as the vessel which transported property from the husband to the first born son. See
id.
290. See id. A woman who survives her husband would have testamentary control over
those retirement assets that she received upon his death.
291. See MacPherson v. MacPherson, 496 F.2d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 1974).
292. See Boggs III, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
293. John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497,
507 (1977) (quoting T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 711 (5th ed.
1956)).




298. SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1120 (1984).
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These goals must be weighed and balanced against one another. One
goal alone cannot trump all other goals.
Society's interest in protecting a predeceased wife's property
rights outweighs society's interest in supporting a second wife. The
second wife has not earned the entire surviving spouse's share, espe-
cially the share which is attributable to the efforts of the first wife. The
second wife is entitled to receive her husband's Social Security bene-
fits, 29 9 part of her husband's retirement assets,300 and a statutory mini-
mum of her husband's estate.30 1 The predeceased wife should have
testamentary power over the retirement benefits she helped earn dur-
ing her time in the marriage.
Moreover, a spouse of the decedent is the only relative protected
against complete disinheritance.30 2 Recognizing a predeceased wife's
property right in her husband's retirement benefits will not leave the
second wife without support. The second wife has at least an elective
share. She had the ability to acquire property before the marriage and
the opportunity to continue to acquire property after the marriage.
Awarding the current spouse all of the assets because she needs them
for support is illusory. She may not need the assets any more so than
the predeceased spouse's heirs and certainly is not more entitled to
them.
Because this social policy is harmful to women's rights, society
should seek to remedy the harm. Women should be treated as equal
partners in a marriage regardless of whether or not they are employed
outside the home. Their contributions as wives and mothers should be
recognized and treated as valuable. In order to correct this inequity,
ERISA's social policy needs to be changed.
V. Solution
The Supreme Court has ruled, and couples are currently bound
by that decision. Therefore, congressional action is now required to
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), (e), (f) (1994); see also Burke & McCouch, supra note
211.
300. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1994). The second
wife would be entitled to the part of the qualified joint and survivor annuity, which was not
awarded as part of a QDRO. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a).
301. The majority of states permit a widow's election whereby the widow can elect to
take the statutory amount of her husband's estate if that amount is greater than what her
husband left her in his will. If the husband dies without a will, all states intestate succession
systems allocate a minimum amount of the husband's estate to his surviving spouse.
302. See Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club-Examining the Financial
[Inisecurity of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 309, 346 (1999).
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remedy this inequity borne by women. Solutions to this problem
abound. This Part will discuss the solutions that are most viable. Spe-
cifically, it proposes the exact language of an amendment to ERISA
that provides the requisite protection of the predeceasing spouse's
interest.
A. Narrow Interpretation of Boggs
One solution, which does not require congressional intervention,
is a narrow interpretation of the holding in Boggs.303 A court could
read the holding so as to limit its application to only predeceasing
non-participant spouses who die prior to retirement of the partici-
pant. Some courts3 0 4 and practitioners305 are already doing so. Al-
though this solution certainly provides some improvement, it does not
fully redress the problem.
While this solution has the benefit of being simple and does not
require an act of Congress, it does lack uniformity. Women who rely
on a court narrowly reading the holding will be gambling with their
property rights. Two women's estates in the same state, in similar situ-
ations, could be faced with very different results depending on how
the courts choose to interpret the Boggs opinion.
Given the current state of the law, many practitioners are taking
the opportunity to plan around the Boggs holding. 30 6 They operate
under the assumption that a woman does not have any right in her
husband's retirement benefits if she predeceases him. Practitioners
then advise their clients to allocate non-retirement benefit assets to
the spouse with the smaller estate by transferring title to the non-par-
ticipant spouse. For example, the couple would place title of the fam-
ily home in the wife's name only to offset her lack of ownership
interest in his retirement benefits. But this solution requires the con-
sent of her husband, who may be reluctant to depart with his share of
some of the marital assets. This solution is also limited to those
couples with access to affordable legal services.
This solution keeps the burden of the problem on women. It re-
quires a woman to affirmatively act to protect her property rights. It
303. See Patricia L. Brown, The Mind-Boggling Bog Broadened by Boggs-A Practitioner's
Approach, SD 53 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUD. 661, 668 (Feb. 25, 1999), available in
WESTLAW at SD53 ALI-ABA 661.
304. See Hawxhurst v. Hawxhurst, 723 A.2d 58 (N.J. 1998); see also Manning v. Hayes,
212 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 2000).
305. See Brown, supra note 303, at 681.
306. See id.
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may disrupt the harmony of marriage and create tension between the
partners, if one spouse is reluctant to a reassignment of assets. This
tension in turn could harm the institution of marriage by resulting in
more divorces. Society does not benefit when more than half of its
marriages end in divorce. 30 7
B. Amend ERISA
1. Revise the Preemption Provision
Several commentators have suggested an amendment to ERISA's
preemption provision, section 1144. One suggestion is to expressly ex-
clude from the preemption provision state community property and
succession laws that do not directly regulate ERISA pension plans.308
Indeed, one student commentator argues that a provision that explic-
itly states ERISA is not intended to preempt state community property
law would solve the inequities created by Boggs.309 This observer fur-
ther argues that Congress should narrow the language of ERISA's
broad preemption provision by returning it to the narrower language
contained in the original House and Senate versions of the provi-
sion.3 10 She believes that this language would limit preemption to
those state laws that affect the regulatory provisions of ERISA.31
Amending the preemption provision to permit application of
community property laws would solve the inequity created by Boggs.
This solution would permit a testamentary disposition of community
property benefits after distribution from the employee benefit plan.312
Another benefit of this option is that it recognizes that women in com-
munity property states have a property right in their husband's retire-
ment benefits; a right which does not extinguish upon her death.
However, this alternative would only benefit women who die in
community property states. It does nothing to solve the inequity prob-
lem for women in non-community property states. Furthermore,
courts would still have to decide when a community property law im-
307. See Linda Henry Elrod, Epilogue: Of Families, Federalization, and a Quest for Policy, 33
FAm. L.Q. 843, 845 (1999) (noting that the number of divorces quadrupled between 1960
and 1999, resulting in nearly one-half of all marriages ending in divorce).
308. See Note, Boggs v. Boggs: State Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in
ERISA's Mire, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 571, 625 (1998) [hereinafter State Community
Property and Succession Rights Wallow].
309. See Note, Equality in Life, Inequality in Death: The Ramifications of the United States
Supreme Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 623, 647 (1998).
310. See id. at 647-48.
311. See id. at 648.
312. See State Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow, supra note 308, at 625.
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pacted a plan and determine if preemption is warranted. Thus,
amending the preemption language of ERISA would only lead to ad-
ditional litigation and limited protection for women.
2. Amend the QDRO Provision to Include Probate Orders
Another potential solution is to amend ERISA's anti-alienation
provision to expressly permit probate orders to qualify as QDROs or
provide a similar provision for probate orders.3 13 One observer insists
that this type of amendment should expressly state that a community
property interest is a "present ownership interest with inherent testa-
mentary rights." 314 Another commentator suggests that the following
words should be added somewhere in the QDRO provision:
A spouse, or estate, with an interest in a pension plan through the
application of community property laws shall be able to obtain a
probate order stating the percentage of the pension plan benefits
to which the spouse, or estate, is entitled. The percentage awarded
shall be determined based on the number of years the couple was
married and the number of years the plan was funded by marital
monies. The percentage to go to the spouse, or estate, cannot ex-
ceed fifty percent (50%) of the total benefits, if there is/are
(an)other spouse(s) at the time of the participant's death.31 5
Amending ERISA's QDRO provision is the best solution to solve
the inequity inherent in the Boggs decision. The QDRO provision is
also the easiest section of ERISA to amend because it has the least
impact on the other sections of ERISA. The suggested language would
limit the amount allocable to the predeceased non-participant spouse
to no more than she is entitled to under state community property
laws.
While these suggestions offer significant improvement over the
current approach, more is needed to protect the rights of all women.
Both solutions are limited to protection of women who live in commu-
nity property states. Women who live in the other forty-one states
would not have a testamentary interest in their husband's retirement
benefits. This solves one inequity problem yet creates another.
Additionally, the author of the suggested amendment fails to in-
dicate how her suggested proposal would be incorporated into the
current statute. The language needs greater clarity and precision. The
suggestion that a spouse could get a probate order to protect her
313. See id.
314. Id.
315. Note, Boggs v. Boggs: Creating Real-Life Cinderellas, 33J. MARSHALL L. REv. 271, 298
(1999).
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rights may not be feasible. In some states, for the probate court to
have jurisdiction, the spouse would have to be dead. The proposed
amendment would only require the probate order to state the per-
centage that the estate would be entitled to. However, the author fails
to describe how this section would interact with the other provisions
of ERISA. Would the probate order have to comply with the other
requirements of a QDRO? Would a probate order become a QDRO?
Or is the commentator suggesting that Congress create a qualified
probate order exemption?
C. Suggested Amendment to the QDRO Provision of ERISA
This section suggests a proposal that hopes to more fully redress
the disparate impact of the Boggs decision. Additionally, it has the ben-
efit of working with the existing language to ease its immediate impact
and later interpretation. Creating a qualified probate order provision
would result in a separate and different set of rules, which could cause
confusion among the courts and plan administrators. ERISA's QDRO
provision could be amended by the addition of two clauses to its ex-
isting framework. First, the definition of a QDRO would need to be
amended. Then, the definition of an alternate payee would also need
to be amended. By merely changing these definitions to incorporate
probate orders, women will have the ability to make testamentary
transfers of their share of their husband's retirement benefits.
1. Changing the Definition of a QDRO
The current definition of a QDRO does not allow for a probate
order to be treated as a domestic relations order. The additions to the
definition, which are bracketed in bold, would include a probate or-
der within the definition of a QDRO. This amendment would also
change Internal Revenue Code section 4 14(p) (1) (B) and the new
provision would read:
(ii) the term "domestic relations order" means any judgment, de-
cree, or order (including approval of a property settlement
agreement) which-
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony pay-
ments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former
spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, [or to
the marital property rights of a deceased spouse] and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (in-
cluding a community property [or probate] law).a 16
316. I.R.C. § 414(p) (1) (B) (1994) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (1994) (altera-
tions added).
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2. Changing the Definition of an Alternate Payee
In order to prevent confusion and allow for uniformity, the defi-
nition of an alternate payee would also need to be amended. Chang-
ing the definition to incorporate the estate of a deceased spouse
would allow a plan to pay benefits directly to the estate. The addition
to section 4 14 (p)(8)317 of the Internal Revenue Code and section
1056(d) (3) (K) of ERISA is bracketed in bold.
The term "alternate payee" means a spouse, former spouse, [estate
of a deceased spouse,] child, or other dependent of a participant
who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to
receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with
respect to such participant.
3. Other Conforming Amendments
In addition to these amendments, another technical amendment
would need to be made. In order for the other amendments to avoid
creating a negative income tax impact upon the participant, the estate
would need to be treated as a distributee for income tax purposes.
Internal Revenue Code section 402(e) (1) (A) would need to be
changed as follows:
For purposes of subsection (a) and section 72, an alternate payee
who is the spouse[, or] former spouse [or estate of a deceased
spouse] of the participant shall be treated as the distributee of any
distribution or payment made to the alternate payee under a quali-
fied domestic relations order (as defined in section 414(p)).
D. Analysis of the Proposed Amendment
1. How It Works
Upon the death of the wife, her estate would include a share of
her husband's retirement benefits. 318 This amendment would leave
the allocation of the retirement benefits up to state law. Some com-
munity property laws would result in the estate being allocated 50% of
the vested balance of the retirement benefits at the time of death to
the estate. Non-community property states could use the same equita-
ble distribution system that they use at divorce. The probate court
37. I.R.C. § 414(p)(8) (1994) and 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (3) (K) (1994).
318. See I.R.C. § 2039 (1994), which includes the value of an annuity in the decedent's
gross estate. In Private Letter Ruling 89-43-006, the Service stated that the value of the
spouse's community interest in the plan is includible in the spouse's gross estate tinder
section 2039(a) even if the spouse cannot dispose of the interest by testamentary disposi-
tion. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-43-006 (July 21, 1989). It is includible in the spouse's gross estate,
because the spouse had a beneficial interest in the plan prior to death. See id.
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would evaluate what the deceased wife's share should be. Her estate
would be permitted to obtain a QDRO in the amount determined by
the probate court. The estate would be the alternate payee. Once the
estate received the funds from the pension* plan, it would distribute
the funds according to either her will or her state's intestacy laws.
2. Effect of the Amendment
The proposed amendment would allow a woman to leave her
property to someone other than her husband. This amendment
would recognize that a woman is entitled to a share of her husband's
benefits because she makes a valuable contribution to the partnership
by taking on the responsibilities of child-care and domestic chores,
and that such contributions are worth more than an inter-vivos mone-
tary reward.
3. Potential Problems
ERISA currently imposes a succession law on the predeceasing
non-participant spouse, from which no woman can opt out. ERISA
forces women to give their interest to their husbands. The proposed
amendment gives women the option of bequeathing their interest to
whomever they choose. If a woman prefers not to choose or fails to
choose, her state will choose for her through its intestate succession
laws. This amendment places the choice in the hands closest to the
retirement benefits: the non-participant spouse and the state in which
she lives.
Some critics may argue that these amendments would impose a
different succession law upon non-participating spouses-that of their
state. Women are then forced to opt out of their state's intestate suc-
cession laws by writing a will if they want their interest to pass in a
manner that is not consistent with the intestate succession laws. Non-
participant spouses would be expected to know or find out their
state's intestate distribution scheme, which may not mirror their
wishes. But these amendments would not be adding anything to the
problem which already exists.
First, the purpose of the intestate distribution scheme is to mirror
how each state thinks its deceased citizens would have wanted their
property distributed if they had written a will.319 If a non-participant
319. See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW AND INEQ. J.
1, 7 (2000) ("The most commonly identified goal of intestacy statutes is to create a disposi-
tive scheme that will carry out the probable intent of most testators.").
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spouse believes that the intestate system of her state does not mirror
her wishes, the burden is upon her to write a will that is consistent
with her wishes.
Is it unfair to place the responsibility of knowing the intestacy
scheme of her state in the hands of the non-participating spouse? It is
already a responsibility that is placed upon all owners of all types of
property and interests. Retirement benefits should not be treated any
differently. A system where the owner of property has a choice as to
the distribution is preferable to a system that gives the owner no
choices.
Another potential problem these amendments may create is the
time and cost involved in keeping an estate open until the funds are
distributed. A pension plan also incurs costs when it deals with the
administration of QDROs. The earliest a QDRO can require payment
of benefits to an alternate payee is when the participant reaches the
earliest retirement age under the participant's pension plan.3 20 ERISA
does not require pension plans to provide for an earlier distribution
date, but it does permit pension plans to provide an earlier distribu-
tion date to alternate payees.3 21 The Department of Labor has ruled
that the costs associated with administering a QDRO can not be borne
solely by the participant and/or the alternate payee. 322 Given the fact
that the plan must bear the cost of the administration, it may be in the
plan's best interest to provide that QDRO payments occur earlier than
the earliest distribution date.
Additionally, costs and time delays exist for QDROs in the con-
text of a divorce. Society did not see those costs or delays significant so
as to deny a non-participant spouse an interest in her husband's pen-
sion plan. Therefore, the potential cost and delay should not be
grounds for denying the predeceased non-participant spouse her in-
terest either. The costs and delays may not be substantial enough to
require Congress to legislate a mandatory distribution deadline for
QDROs. But if the need for additional legislation is discovered, Con-
gress should be quick to remedy the problem.
Conclusion
Women make valuable contributions to society and their families
when they opt to forego the monetary rewards of employment in or-
320. See I.R.C. § 414(p) (4) (B) (1994).
321. See Cindy Lynn Wofford, Divorce and Separation, 515 TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS
A-i, at A-26 (1999) (citing Treas. Regs. § 1.401(a)-13(g) (as amended in 1976)).
322. See Department of Labor Advisory Opinion 94-32A (Aug. 15, 1994).
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der to raise their children and provide domestic services for their fam-
ilies. Society should recognize those contributions by ensuring that a
woman has a property right in her husband's retirement benefits re-
gardless of how the marriage ends. ERISA protects women who di-
vorce their husbands and women who survive their husbands. ERISA
should also protect women who do not survive their husbands. Once it
does, it should be extremely difficult for a woman to fall through the
cracks of ERISA protection.
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